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In recent years there has been a good deal of dehate about whether
literary works can contribute to knowledge of the world. Many of the
writers who have held that literature has cognitive value have defended
the traditional view that works ofliterature assert truths. t Other authors
have focused on rehabilitating the concept of meaning. Literature is a
source of knowledge (which involves truth and meaning) but any
successful attempt to demonstrate that literature is a source ofknowledge
has to restore to a central place in literary theory a concept even more
venerable than those of truth and meaning. I refer to the concept of
representation. In spite ofthis. representation has received Iinle anention
in recent discussions of Iiterature.2 This essay is an attempt to
compensate for this neglect. It is. however, only a prolegomena to a
more complete defence of the cognitive value of literature. This essay
defends the claim that literature represents, and indicates how it does
so. It remains to show how literature's power to represent is the key to
responding to those who deny the cognitive value of literature.
This essay is divided into four sections. The first section provides a
definition of representation and identifies two main issues that arise
in the context of reflection about representation in literature. The first
issue is that of whether literature can even properly be said to be
representational. This question is addressed in Section II where it is
argued that literature can represent. In Section III I tum to the second
issue identified in Section I, that of the form of representation found in
literature. I argue that the sort of representation found in literature is
very different from the sort found in, for example, other uses of
language. Section IV provides a conclusion.
I
Nowadays. when people talk about representation in connection with
the arts, they usually have in mind the visual arts and pictorial
representation. Nelson Goodman is at some pains to distinguish between
description. which employs language. and representation. which
involves another sort of symbol system. The view that works of
literature represent can. however, be traced at least as far hack as the
Poetics and Aristotle's views have been echoed repeatedly. Sir Philip
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Sidney, for example. wrote that 'Poesy ... is an art of imitation, for
so Aristotle termeth it in the word JllJl77(Jlf: [mimesis] ... with this
end, to teach and delight'.3 Similarly, Tasso maintained that 'Poetry ...
is an imitation of human action, fashioned to teach us how to live'.4
Dr Johnson goes so far as to say that Shakespeare 'holds up to his
readers a faithful mirrour of manners and of life'.5 Novelists have
similarly maintained that their works represent. Henry James held that
'The only reason for the existence of a novel is that it does attempt to
represent life'.6 These quotations suggest that there is a sense in which
literature represents and this essay defends this suggestion.
Before we can pursue the question of whether literature represents,
a definition ofrepresentation is needed. Ioffer the following (stipulative)
definition of a representation:
R is a representation of some object 0 if and only if R is intended by a
subject S to stand for 0 and an audience A (where A is not idenlicaJ to
S) can recognise that R stands for O.
So defined. there are three necessary conditions of something's being
a representation. For a start, if something is a representation of some
object, it must stand for the object. Second. if something is a
representation. it must be intentionally used as a representation. This
may be called the intentionality condition. Finally, there is the
recognition condition: nothing is a representation of an object unless it
can be recognised as standing for the object by someone other than the
person (or persons) who intends that it be a representation of the object.
A few comments on each of these conditions are required, particularly
an account of what it is for something to stand for something else.
Let us begin by considering the intentionality condition. The point
of this condition is to indicate that nothing may accidentally be a
representation. Imagine that a rock in the Australian outback is eroded.
by the blind forces of nature, into a form that bears an uncanny
resemblance to Charles Dickens. No matter how close the resemblance,
the rock is not a representation of Dickens. Similarly, if some cracks
should spontaneously develop in a rock face, and apparently spell out
a description of Dickens, the cracks are not a representation of the
novelist. The cracks are not actually sentences. They resemble sentences,
but they have no meanings and no truth values since they are not the
intentional products of a language-user. Perhaps if someone were to
suggest that the cracks be treated as meaningful inscriptions they
become SUCh. but this is only because someone has come along and
supplied the necessary intention to represent.
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The recognition condition states that it is not sufficient that someone
intend that something represent an object for the thing to represent the
object. People other than the creator of the representation must in fact
be able to determine what is represented. I may draw a squiggle, or
write a paragraph with the intention of representing Jane Austen. If,
however, no one besides myself can actually recognise that Austen is
represented by my squiggle, then I have failed to represent her even
though I intended to do so. (In other words, S may be a member of A,
but may not exhaust A.)
The recognition condition does not require that, in any given case,
everyone be able to recognise what something represents. Members of
an audience will need to possess cenain abilities if they are to recognise
that an object is a representation. Many, perhaps all, representations
are created in accordance with some rules or conventions. There are,
for example, conventions of pictorial representation, and linguistic
representation is entirely dependent on convention. Familiarity with
these conventions is a necessary condition of being able to determine
what is represented. In general, audience members will also need to be
familiar with the object or objects represented, if they are to recognise
that something is a representation. For example, an audience cannot
recognise that a picture represents San Marco unless they know
something about the appearance of the Venetian cathedral. So long as
these conditions are met, however, if something is a representation,
then an audience must be able to determine what is represented.
The most important condition of something's being arepresentation
is that it stand for something. The key to understanding the concept
of standing for is the concept of intentionality or aboutness. A
representation is always about something. Consequently, for every
representation there is some obje<.:t which is represented, or objects
which arc represented. Someone who has the capacity to understand a
representation has the capacity to grasp what it is about. A representation
will, then, bring to the mind of the qualified audience member the
object which is represented. So, for example, someone acquai nted with
the rules which Canaletto followed in producing paintings is able to
recognise that some painting is a representation of San Marco or the
Grand Canal. Similarly, someone who understands English and has a
rudimentary knowledge ofEnglish geography will be able to recognise
Jerome K. Jerome's description of the Thames, in Three Men in a Boat,
as a representation of the river. The key point to note here is that if the
intentionality and recognition conditions are met, then the third condition
is also met. That is, if someone creates a work with the intention of
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representing an object. and suitably-qualified people can recognise
that the object is represented (it is brought to mind), then the work
stands for the object.
Two important points arise from what has been said so far about
representation. The first point is that representations come in several
varieties. On the present definition of representation, a description can
count as a representation as much as can a picture. All three conditions
of being a representation can be met by a description. An author can
intend to represent an object and readers can recognise that a description
stands for the object. The sort of representation found in Three Men in
a Boat differs quite dramatically from the sort found in the Canaletto.
Providing a taxonomy of the types of representation becomes even
more difficult when we reflect that scientific theories may be said to
represent the world and that we speak of mental representation. Such a
taxonomy is necessary, however, if we are to understand that Iiferature
represents and how it does so. An account of literary representation
will have to specify what form (or. perhaps. forms) of representation
are found in literature.
The second point which has emerged in this section is even more
fundamental. As noted. a representation always has an object which it
is about. This feature of representations can give rise to scepticism
about whether literature is, in general. representational. The descriptions
of the Thames in Three Men in a Boat can represent the Thames, since
there really is such a river. Many of the persons and objects which
feature prominently in literature are fictional, however, and something
that does not exist cannot be represented. (A non-existent object can, of
course, be pictured or described, but these pictures and descriptions are
not representations.) Elizabeth Bennet, Elizabeth's pianoforte,
Fitzwilliam Darcy, Mr Collins, Longbourne, and other persons and
things described in Pride and Prejudice do not exist. Consequently,
they cannot be represented. Since so much of literature is fiction, a
preliminary question needs to be addressed before we can go on to the
question ofwhat form literary representation takes. This is the question
of whether literature represents at all.
n
Let us start with the question of whether literature is representational.
Even those who are sceptical about the claim that literature is generally
representational will allow that there are some instances of
representation in literature. Real people and things are sometimes
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represented in literature. Few will deny that Three Men in a Boal
represents the Thames. Similarly, it is reasonably uncontroversial that
Bleak House represents London, that War and Peace represents
Napoleon, and so on. The class of literary representations can be
expanded a little if we allow that some fictional characters represent
real objects. For example, Harold Skimpole (in Bleak House) is a
representation of Leigh Hunt, and the Grand Academy of Lagado,
described in Part III of Gulliver's Travels. is a representation of the
Royal Society of Swift's day. Skimpole and the Grand Academy of
Lagado are fictional, but they seem to meet all the criteria necessary for
being representations. By his own account, Dickens intended to represent
Leigh Hunt in the character ofSkimpole. Moreover. anyone acquainted
with Hunt apparently had Iinle difficulty recognising Skimpole as a
representation of Hunt. Readers clearly had Hunt brought to mind by
Skimpole. Characters such as Skimpole and things such as the Grand
Academy may be called partially fictional. Partially fictional'items
unquestionably can be representational.
If the sorts of literary representations given in the previous paragraph
exhaust the class of literary representations. however, most works of
literature are mostly non-representational. In most works of literature,
few of the people and objects described are real particulars and few of
the fictional items are partially fictional. Most characters and objects in
literature are purely fictional, that is. they are not based on some
original particular object. Even if partially fictional objects are
representations, it is not clear that purely fictional objects are
representations. In the cases of most characters and ohjects in most
works of literature, the author does not intend to represent some
particular object. Readers of most literary works cannot recognise
most of the people and things as representing anyone in particular. It
seems, then, that the conditions of representation are not met and that
representation is not an important part of literature. If so. literature
owes little of its value to its capacity to represent. Still, it would be a
mistake to accept this conclusion. Even assuming that Austen had no
one in particular in mind when she created Mr Collins. the descriptions
of that worthy clergyman should be regarded as representational. More
generally, literary works which are not primarily concerned with the
representation of identifiable real particular objects can be
representational.
The suggestion that passages dealing with, for example, Mr Collins
are not representational does not accord with most people's experience
of literature. It is very common for readers to experience some purely
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fictional characters and objects as lifelike, while other such items
strike readers as artificial and contrived. If we accept that passages
dealing with purely fictional characters represent nothing, it follows
that no passage describing purely fictional characters is more
representational than any other. A character such as Mr Col1ins is the
product of keen observation ofsocial dynamics and insight into human
nature. He is drawn with sensitivity and verisimilitude. On the other
hand, we have characters from a bodice-ripper, say a dissolute and
withdrawn but wise and warm-hearted viscount who reforms his life
and gives up his title to marry a shy, poetic factory girl, who has a
degree in archaeology. Such a character is not the product of careful
observation of anything. Nevertheless, on the view that we are
considering, Austen's descriptions of Mr Collins are no more
representational than a passage from a trashy romance. This does not
seem right. I submit that there is a sense in which Austen has succeeded
in representing something, but the author of the bodice-ripper has not.
The impression that some passages dealing with purely fictional
characters are representational is reinforced by reflection on another
feature of the experience of literature. It is common for readers of
literature to recognise features of themselves, or of other people, in
purely fictional characters. The toadyi ng behaviour ofMr Colli ns may,
for example, remind a reader of his own behaviour. when he was a
young graduate student at a philosophy conference. On the other hand.
no one is likely to be reminded of anything real in reading. in the trashy
romance, about the former viscount who marries the factory girl. The
best explanation of this difference between the experience of reading
Pride and Prejudice and reading the bodice-ripper is that the former
represents types of objects with actual instances, while the latter does
not. In this context it is worth remembering that Trollope aimed to
teach 'by representing to [his) readers characters like themselves, or
which they might liken to themselves'.7 Readers are not only reminded
of people. They can also be reminded of things. For example, it is
virtually impossible for anyone with the least knowledge ofnineteenth-
century Britain to read (in Hard Times) about Coketown without being
reminded of real industrial towns.
If we accept that Austen's purely fictional objects (and those in
similar works of literature) are representational, we have to say what
they represent. The descriptions of Mr Collins cannot represent Mr
Col1ins, since he does not exist and non-existent objects cannot be
represented. Fortunately, something can be a representation without
being a representation of a particular object. A representation can be a
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representation of a type of objects or (as nominalists would prefer to
say) aclass ofobjects. This point was made in almost the earliest set of
reflections on representation in literature. the Poetics, where Aristotle
wrote that 'poetry is something more philosophic and of more serious
import than history; for poetry tends to deal with the general, while
history is concerned with delimited particular facts'.8 If Aristotle is
right, purely fictional items in all of literature (and not just poetry) can
represent types or classes ofohjects. (For the sake of convenience and
without any intention of stepping on nominalist toes. I will speak of the
representation of types of ohjects.)
Before considering how literature can represent types of objects, a
few general remarks on the representation oftypcs is in order. There is
nothing very mysterious about such representation. An illustration of a
wombat in an encyclopedia article on wombats may be a drawing of
some particular womhat. Whether or not the illustration is a portrait of
some particular marsupial, however, it does not stand for only one
wombat. Rather. it is a representation of a type of animal. Similarly, a
statue of a soldier atop a World War I memorial is not (or not only: it
could be aportrait) arepresentation ofsome particular soldier. It is also
a representation of a type: the soldier who fought and died in the
trenches. say. In these cases. the creator of the representation intends
to represent not just some individual animal or person. Moreover,
audiences do not helieve that such representations are representations
ofsome individual thing. Readers of the encyclopedia, for example, do
not think that the drawing of the wombat is a drawing of some
particular animal. Rather. they see it as standing for all wombats.
A similar sort of representation of types is possible in literature.
Austen's descriptions of Mr Collins are representations of a class
of person: the self-important, pompous and ohsequious toady. It is
di fficult to be sure what Austen intended to do in creating the character
of Mr Collins. but it is fair to assume that authors commonly intend
to represent a type. Certainly many readers recognise Mr Collins as
standing for a familiar type. Similarly. Dickens's descriptions of
Coketown represent a type of town produced hy the industrial
revolution. In this case it is clear that Dickens intended Coketown to
stand for such towns and Hard Times hrings to the mind of (minimally
informed) readers just such towns.
It is interesting to note that even real or partially fictional items are
often representations of a type, even if they arc also representations of
individual things. Skimpole, for example. is a representation of Leigh
Hunt but at the same time he is a representation of persons of the same
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type: lazy people who affect an unworldliness, but live comfortably at
the expense of others. Similarly, Napoleon in War and Peace can be a
representation of a certain sort ofheroic indi vidual and a real place can
stand for, say, all large, alienating cities.
The view that literature can represent types of objects is able to
do justice to both of the features of the experience of literature that
make us uneasy about the suggestion that most literature represents
nothing. For a start, it becomes possible to explain why readers think
that Pride and Prejudice is representational, but our imaginary romance
is not. The character from our imaginary bodice-ripper cannot represent
because there is nothing for it to represent. There is no such real,
particular person as the formerly-dissolute viscount who gives up
his title and marries the factory girl and there is no instance of the
type either. On the other hand, the descriptions of Mr Collins can be
representational because there is a type of character, one readers are
familiar with, similar to Mr Collins. Moreover, a reader can be reminded
of his behaviour at some long ago conference because his behaviour
was the type of behaviour displayed by Mr Collins in the presence of
Lady Catherine.9
At this point it might be objected that descriptions of purely
fictional entities are representational in one sense but not representational
in another, fulIer sense. Nelson Goodman has distinguished between
the sort of representation found in a picture of a real person (Jane
Austen, say) and the sort of representation found in a picture of a
fictional character, such as Mr Collins. to The portrait of Austen
involves a relation between two objects: the picture and the ohject
represented. The picture of Mr Collins does not involve such a relation.
Mr Collins does not exist and the picture cannot, therefore, stand in
the same relation to him as the portrait of Austen stands in to her. In
Goodman's terminology, the picture of Mr ColIins is a Mr Collins-
representation. not a representation of Mr Collins. This distinction is
applied to literary representation by Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugom
Olsen. They accept that literature can represent types, but they maintain
that such representations are non-relational. That is, Lamarque and
Olsen claim, representations of types are like pictures of Mr Collins.
According to the definition of representation adopted above, alI
representation is representation of something. Representation so
characterised is always relational and 'non-relational representation'
is an oxymoron. Consequently, Goodman's characterisation of the
picture of Mr Collins (a picture of nothing) as in any sense a
representation is misleading. A similar sort of problem is involved
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when Lamarque and Olsen allow that literature involves the
representation of types. but maintain that such representations are
non-relational. On their view. we find in literature what we might
call (following Goodman) type-representations, not representations of
types. In adopting this position. Lamarque and Olsen are really just
saying that literature docs not represent types. If they are right. much
of literature is non-representational, at least in the sense in which
'representation' is understood in this essay. ConsequentIy, it is necessary
to provide some reason for thinking that we find in literature real
representations of types.
It is difficult to see what motivates Lamarque and Olsen since it
is easy to show that literature, even literature which involves purely
fictional entities. can contain full-fledged, relational representations
and not mere type-representations. Non-relational (pseudo-) represen-
tation of the sort Goodman discusses is only an issue when there is
nothing to represent. The picture of Mr Collins is not a representation
of Mr Collins because he does not exist. As a result. the picture is
merely a Mr Collins-representation (which is no representation at all,
on my definition of representation). No such prohlcm arises in the case
of the representation of types since types, or classes. of objects really
exist. For example. there is a class of pompous toadies. Since this class
exists, something can stand for or be a (relational) representation of
them, so long as the recognition and intentionality conditions are met.
We have already secn that such representation is more than possihle
and that purely fictional entities are actually representations of types. It
seems then that we have no grounds for scepticism about the claim that
literature. even literature which involves purely fictional entities, can
be representational. We can begi n to address the question of the nature
of this representation.
III
As noted above, representations come in a variety of forms. Acommon
way to slice up the class of representations divides its members into
pictorial representations. on the one hand. and descriptions or linguistic
representations. on the other. When representations are divided up in
this way. photographs, representational paintings and some sculptures
belong to one sub-set. Scienti fic theories and historical descriptions
belong to the other sub-set. This leaves the question of where literary
representations fit in and it may seem that they are in the same suh-set
as the representations found in history and science. After all, science.
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history and literature all employ language, and one might reasonably
think that they represent in much the same way. Anyone who thinks
this way is, however, mistaken. We need a taxonomy of representations
which indicates that those in literature are akin to those in painting and
photography.
In order to understand how literature represents, we need. to
distinguish between semantic representations and illustrative
representations (or illustrations). This distinction is not equivalent to
the distinction between pictorial representations and representations
which employ language. Language can be used both to assert that
something is the case and to illustrate that it is the case. Semantic
representations are true statements. Statements represent states of
affairs in virtue of standing to them in familiar semantic relations. The
component pans of an statement refer to the objects which make up a
state of affairs and an statement as a whole is true if and only if a state
of affairs is as the statement asserts. An illustration, on the other hand,
does not assert that some state of affairs is the case. Rather, it is (in
a sense to be explicated) a depiction. Depiction can be pictorial, but
it can also be verbal. A few examples will clarify the concepts of
semantic representation and illustration.
An ordi nary statement such as 'The cat is on the mat' is an example
of a semantic representation. I I This sentence can represent the cat on
the mat since English-speakers have assigned it and its component
words certain uses. Given the way we use our words. 'cat' refers to the
cat, 'mat' refers to the mat and 'is on' denotes the relation in which the
cat stands to the mat. The sentence as a whole is true in English if and
only if a certain state of affairs obtains. If the cat is on the mat, the
sentence is true and represents. in virtue of the semantic conventions of
English, the cat on the mat. If the cat is not on the mat, the sentence is
false and fails to represent an existing state ofaffairs. More sophisticated
examples of semantic representation are typically found in history,
philosophy and the sciences. Only semantic representations, sentences
which make statements, are properly said to be true. Truth and falsity
are not properties of illustrations.
Many photographs and paintings can serve as examples of
illustrative representations. An illustration represents by depicting
(aspects of) its object. To say that an illustration represents an ohject by
depicting it is to say that the illustration gives an example of some
characteristic of the object. A painting by Canaleno. for example,
stands for San Marco, in pan, because it gives some examples of
features of the Venetian cathedral. San Marco is perceived as having
136
James O. Young
rounded arches and domes, and the painting has curved patches of
colour which depict these features of the church. Viewers see the
Canaletto as a representation of San Marco because they recognise
that the painting and its object resemble each other in a relevant
respect. (As we have seen, one of the conditions of something's being
a representation is that it be recognisable as a representation.)
It can be objected at this point that, in introducing the concept
of illustration, I have simply reintroduced the naive theory that
representations imitate or resemble their objects. I am aware, of
course, of the controversy surrounding the concept of imitation. t2 In
saying that illustration involves depiction, I do not want to suggest that
there is no element of convention involved in such representation. At
the very least, some selection of the features of an .object to be
represented is involved. Nor do I claim that an illustration imitates
things as they really are. On the contrary, I believe that an illustration
depicts features that an object is thought or perceived to have.
Nevertheless, I believe. and will for present purposes assume, that it
makes sense to talk ofa representation resembling something in certain
respects. Those who are sceptical about this assumption can still accept
some of what I say below. since not all depiction in literature involves
resemblance between the text and what is represented.
If we accept the distinction between semantic and illustrative
representation, we need to ask which sort of representation is found
in literature. As noted above. there is a temptation to think that literary
representations are semantic ones. After all. like history and science.
literature employs language. This temptation should be resisted.
The first indication that literary representations are not semantic
representations is that many of the sentences in literature are false and
many ofthe terms employed in literature refer to nothing. For example,
most of the sentences in Pride and Prejudice are false and 'Elizabeth
Bennet'. 'Fitzwilliam Darcy'. •Netherfield' , and so on have no referents.
A sentence is a semantic representation, however, if and only if it is
true. If the only type of representation Pride and Prejudice could
employ were of the semantic variety. we would have to conclude that
it does not represent. If there is good reason to suppose that literature
represents. it follows that literature employs some form ofrepresentation
other than semantic representation.
The conclusion of the previous paragraph was a lillie too hasty.
Many writers have argued that, although the sentences which make up
a work of literature are false. still the work can be seen as making true
statements. Some writers have held that. although false. the sentences
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in a novel such as Pride and Prejudice imply true statements. One can
hold that it implies, for example, that 'First impressions are a poor
guide to a person's character' or 'Obsequious toadies are contemptible' .
Other writers have maintained that sentences can be literally false, but
'metaphorically true'. Here I do not have the space to rehash the
arguments against these two attempts to show that literature makes true
assertions. 13 Suffice it to say that I think that these arguments are
decisive and that if literature represents, it does not do so by making
true statements. Consequently, I am moved to search for a way in
which literature can represent without making true statements.
Even if there is reason to believe that literature does not involve
semantic representation, it remains to be shown that it can employ
illustration. We can begin to make the case for the literary use of
illustration by reflecting that ordi nary uses of language afford examples
of illustrative representation. I can use language to illustrate, rather
than assert, that the Academic Vice-president of a certain university is
silly. I can say, for example, 'Our Vice-president has solemnly asserted
that students are our clients and our partners. He added that this has
something to do with Asia-Pacific initiatives'. It is absurd to suppose
that a student (qua student) can be both the client and partner of his
teachers, and not much less silly to suppose that he is either. Moreover,
views about students have nothing to do with Asia-Pacific initiatives,
whatever they might be. I have not, however, actually asserted that the
Vice-president is unintelligent for believing such twaddle. I have not
provided a semantic representation of his state of mind. Instead, I have
represented his lack of intelligence simply by giving examples of the
sorts of things he says.
Instances of illustrative representation identical to the sort found in
ordinary conversation are found in literature. Consider a rudimentary
work of literature such as Scott Adams' comic strip. Dilbert. Adams
frequently uses illustration to represent the idiocy of the pointy-haired
boss. In one strip, the pointy-haired boss announces at a meeting that,
'Ten of our finest executives got together and created a statement of
our core values'. In the next frame, the boss reads from this statement:
'We help the community and the world by producing state-of-the-art
business solutions' .15 The difference between my illustration and
Adams' representation of the boss is that I represented a real university
administrator, but there is no real pointy-haired boss. Adams can only
represent a certain sort of manager, which is certainly what he intends
to do. Adams does not assert that people like the pointy-haired boss
are silly twits for taking such nonsense seriously. Instead, he uses an
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example of the sort of thing such people say to provide an illustrative
representation of such people and of their c1uelessness.
This example from Dilben ofiIIustrative representation is an example
of one of three sorts of depiction which can be found in literature.
(These sorts of illustration are neither exhaustive nor exclusive. I do
not suggest that these are the only kinds of literary depiction, but they
are three ofthe most important. A work of literature can simultaneously
employ all three sorts.) I will refer to this first sort of depiction as
verbal depiction. In verbal depiction, instances of what sorts of things
people say (or think) are used in representing their characters. states of
mind or other of their characteristics. The other forms of depiction
which I wish to identify are descriptive and formal depiction. In
descriptive depiction. descriptions of an object are used. not to make
statements about it, but to represent it by means of examples. An
instance of formal depiction uses the formal properties of the literary
text to represent some object. The formal properties of the text have
some relevant property in common with what is represented. A few
examples will make clearer what I mean in talking of these forms of
depiction.
More sophisticated examples of verbal depiction than can be culled
from Ditbert can be found in Dickens. In Bleak House, for example.
examples of the Reverend Mr Chadband's utterances are used to
represent a certain sort of unctuously sanctimonious character.
When Mr Chadband. sermonising on the subject of 'Terewth', says
(in Chapter 25) 'Say not to me that it is not the lamp of lamps. I say to
you. it is. I say to you. a million times over, it is. It is. I say to you that
I will proclaim it to you, whether you like it or not'. Dickens gives a
wonderful representation of a sort of character I can see every Sunday
morning on television. In this example, not only what is said, but how
it is said determines what is depicted. Notice that Dickens does not
assert that people like Mr Chadband are silly and sanctimonious.
Instead, examples of their discourse illustrate them in such a way that
this is apparent.
A good example of descriptive depiction is found in Pride and
Prejudice. Nowhere in the novel does Austen make assertions about
the character of men like Wickham. Nevertheless. this type ofcharacter
is plainly represented. One technique Austen uses is giving descriptions
of the sort of actions people like Wickham perform. Descriptions can
be used to make statements. but they can also be used to give examples.
In Pride and Prejudice we are given, for example, descriptions of
Wickham's over-familiarity on first meeting Elizabeth, his avoidance
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of the ball at Netherfield, his courtship of Mary King, and so on. 1llese
descriptions are not being used to make assertions (they are, after all,
not intended to be taken as true.) Rather the descriptions are used to
give examples of the behaviour of a certain sort of man. 1llese
examples represent an unprincipled and selfish character and represent
it as bad.
Formal depiction involves a resemblance between formal
characteristics of a text (often a poetical text) and the object being
represented. Good examples of such depiction are found in
Shakespeare's Sonnet CXXIX. In this sonnet, Shakespeare represents
impetuous lust and the effect ofsuch an emotion on the mind. The lines
of the sonnet are impulsive, rude and fractured:
The expense of spirit in a waste of shame
Is lust in action; and till action, lust
Is perjured, murderous, bloody, full of blame,
Savage, extreme, rude, cruel, not to blIst.
The thoughts of a person in the grip of lust are similarly impulsive and
rude. A few lines later, the repeated h's, especially in line 10, ('Had,
having, and in quest to have, ... ') make the poem resemble panting.
On the face of it, this poem is a series of statements, but the semantic
properties of the poem are incidental to its capacity to represent a
particular state of mind. Instead, examples of certain characteristics
and sounds are used as illustrations.
This last example indicates that even when the sentences which
make up a work of literature are true, they are not (or not only)
semantic representations. A clearer example is provided by the opening
sentence of Wordsworth's 'Tintern Abbey':
Five years have past; five summers, with the length
Of five long winters! and I hear
These waters, rolling from their mountain-springs
With a soft inland murmur ...
This sentence is probably true (apart from the bit about mountains).
Five years did elapse between the time Wordsworth last visited the
area which he describes and when he wrote this sentence. He did hear
the Wye murmur as its waters rolled from their springs. As a true
sentence, the sentence is a semantic representation. It does not follow,
however, that the passages which contain these sentences are
simply semantic representations. True sentences can also be part of
an illustration. In the sentence in question and the succeeding ones,
Wordsworth is not simply making statements. Rather, he is illustrating
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his feelings about a particular sort of country and representing a
perspective on the natural world. The sentences illustrate a certain
perspective on nature. The fact that the sentences are true is irrelevant
since even if every sentence in the poem were false. if Wordsworth
were mistaken about where he was or when he was last there. even if
Wordsworth had created an imaginary river valley, the poem would
still be an illustrative representation.
It is true that. in some cases. the truth of sentences in a work of
literature has an effect on the work qua illustrative representation.
Moby Dick. for example, even apart from the chapters which are
effectively essays on the whaling trade. contains many true sentences
about the equipment and practices of whaling ships. I assume it is
(or was) true that 'When in the Southern Fishery, a captured Sperm
Whale, after long and weary toil. is brought alongside late at night. it is
not. as a general thing at least. customary to proceed at once to the
business of cutting him in' (Chapter LXV). Similarly. in Anna of the
Five Towns we find true sentences about the production of pottery. The
use of true sentences in these novels is simply a maner of style. True
sentences can give a work an air of verisimilitude and they are often
used in realist novels as means of enhancing a descriptive depiction.
Realism is. however, simply one technique that can be used in literary
representation. A work of science fiction or fantasy without a single
remotely true sentence can still represent, so long as the three conditions
identified in Section I are met.
The use of true sentences can have an impact on what is represented
in a work of literature. Consider the use of true sentences in the context
of verbal depiction. Having a character utter a number of true sentences
can contribute to the fact that a trustworthy. insightful or veracious
character is represented. (On the other hand, a character who utters
falsehoods is represented in quite another light.) Nevertheless. passages
where true sentences are used in this manner are still instances of
illustration.
IV
One advantage of the present approach to representation in literature
is that it makes it possihle to explain why preachy, didactic works of
literature are not usually any good. A novel (Robert Heinlein's Starship
Troopers is a good or. rather. bad example) which contains Iinle but
statements-and thinly disguised statements--<Joes not take advantage
of the mode of representation (illustration) most effectively employed
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by literature. Bare statements are oflittJe (cognitive) value unless they
are true and some reasons are given for believing them. In order to be
a source ofknowledge, statements need to be marshalled into arguments
for conclusions, as they are in history, philosophy, the sciences and
other disciplines. The best novels are likely to be those characterised
by the effective use of illustrative representation. (In this context, 'the
best' may turn out to be relative to an audience.)
Scepticism about the claim that literature involves the assertion of
truths is often the basis for doubt about the cognitive value of literature.
This essay makes clear that if one wants to establish that literature has
no cognitive value, it is not sufficient to argue that it makes no true
statements. Even if literature does not assert truths, it can still reveal
them. The case for the claim that literature involves illustrative
representation is the beginning of a case for the view that literature
can be a source of knowledge.
As noted at the outset, this essay is merely a prolegomena to a full
defence of the cognitive status of literature. Here I have simply shown
that literature can represent the world and given some indication of
the ways in which it represents. Once it is established that literature
involves illustrative representation (and not the semantic representation
characteristic of, for example, history and science) a great deal remains
to be said about literary representation. In particular, it remains to be
seen how literary representations can be a source of knowledge and
understanding. 16 Only when this further step is taken do we have the
basis of a reply to those sceptical about the value, particularly the
cognitive value, of Iiterature.J7
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